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Ken Livingstone : the thorn in New Labour’s side 
 
Abstract 
Ever since Ken Livingstone became leader of the Greater London Council (GLC) in 1981, 
he was a constant threat for the political integrity of the Labour Party until Mrs Thatcher 
decided to do away with this tier of local government in 1986. The antagonism between the 
outspoken Livingstone and the Labour Party came to a head during the period leading up to 
the first mayoral elections in London in May 2000. After a rigged primary election 
Livingstone had been forced into becoming an independent candidate but despite being 
excluded from the Labour Party, he managed to become the first directly elected mayor of the 
capital city. From his new vantage point at the head of the Greater London Authority (GLA), 
the “third man” of England continued to defy New Labour when he considered that central 
government policies did not tally with what Londoners needed. The success of the congestion 
charge considerably reinforced his popularity and New Labour reluctantly reintegrated him 
within its ranks to fight the 2004 mayoral election under its colours. Despite this move, 
Livingstone continued to defend the GLA’s right to develop policies in keeping with the 
decentralisation of power even if signs of greater cooperation with central government were 
obvious, especially when London was given the 2012 Olympic Games in July 2005. This new 
stance did not prevent him from losing the 2008 election when the Conservative candidate, 
Boris Johnson, became mayor of London. 
This article will examine the antagonism between Ken Livingstone and the Labour Party in 
its “old” and “new” versions. New Labour created the GLA hoping that it would be the ideal 
relay for its political project in the capital. Had they realised that the post of executive mayor 
was almost tailor made for “red” Kenneth Livingstone, they would most certainly have had 
second thoughts. 
 
Résumé 
À partir du moment où en 1981 Ken Livingstone occupe le poste de dirigeant du Greater 
London Council, il devient une menace permanente pour l’intégrité politique du Parti 
travailliste, jusqu’à ce que Mme Thatcher décide, en 1986, de supprimer cette couche de 
gouvernance territoriale. L’antagonisme entre Livingstone, l’homme politique qui ne mâche 
pas ses mots, et le Parti travailliste atteint son paroxysme pendant la période qui précède les 
premières élections à la mairie de Londres de 2000.  À l’issue de primaires truquées, 
Livingstone est acculé à présenter une candidature indépendante mais malgré son exclusion 
du Parti travailliste il parvient à devenir le premier maire élu de la capitale. Depuis son siège à 
la tête de la mairie de Londres, le « troisième homme » de l’Angleterre continue de défier le 
New Labour lorsqu’il considère que les choix politiques du gouvernement ne correspondent 
pas aux intérêts des Londoniens. Le succès de sa taxe anti-embouteillages renforce sa 
popularité et le New Labour le réintègre, quoiqu’à contrecœur pour faire campagne en son 
nom lors des élections à la mairie de 2004. En dépit de cette manœuvre, Livingstone continue 
de défendre le droit de la GLA de développer des stratégies politiques en adéquation avec la 
décentralisation du pouvoir même si les signes de coopération avec le gouvernement se 
multiplient surtout lorsqu’en juillet 2005, Londres se voit attribuer les Jeux Olympiques de 
2012. Cette nouvelle approche de la cohabitation ne l’empêche toutefois pas de perdre les 
élections de 2008 lorsque Boris Johnson, le candidat du Parti conservateur est élu maire de 
Londres. 
Cet article étudiera l’antagonisme entre Ken Livingstone et le Parti travailliste dans sa 
version ancienne et plus moderne. Le New Labour créa la mairie de Londres dans l’espoir 
d’en faire le relais idéal, dans la capitale, de son projet politique. S’il avait su à quel point ce 
poste était fait sur mesure pour Ken le « rouge », il y aurait sans doute réfléchi à deux fois.
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Ken Livingstone: The Thorn in (New) Labour’s Side 
 
 
Ken Livingstone is one of those politicians whom it is difficult to ignore: whether you 
love or despise him, admire or feel contempt for his political action, he stands out as one of 
the most intriguing politicians of the recent political landscape in Great Britain. Yet 
“Livingstonites”―like Bevannites or Bennites―just do not exist because Livingstone’s sense 
of independence has always set him apart from the rest. Few people owe him personal loyalty, 
only support. He belongs to a rare breed of public figures, those who from one day to the next 
can enjoy immense popularity only to fall into a trough of opprobrium. Livingstone has done 
just this on many occasions and during the campaign to choose the next mayor of London in 
2012, he is more than likely to play a front stage role once again. 
During the 1980s, Livingstone symbolised the “loony left”, the extreme wing of the 
Labour Party that was slowly but surely bringing about its downfall and which along with 
Militant Tendency, the modernisers had to mercilessly weed out of the party’s ranks if they 
wanted Labour to have the slightest chance of returning to government. But Livingstone has 
always been at his best in the face of adversity and by and large resisted his party’s attempts 
to prevent him from enacting his particular brand of municipal socialism. Likewise, Mrs 
Thatcher had to resort to major surgery on the organisation of local government in order to rid 
it of the sort of approach to politics that she abhorred but what the Metropolitan Councils 
seemed to excel in.
1
 
It was after the third successive defeat of Labour in 1992 that interest flared up once 
again for a new central authority in London, the only European capital city not to boast one. 
Labour doubtlessly believed that if they controlled the capital city, this would give them a 
strong foothold on the way back to the front stage of national politics. The voice of London 
had somehow been extinguished and the 32 boroughs were frequently finding themselves at 
loggerheads over pan-London strategy. In particular, major cultural projects for the capital 
were clearly suffering from the lack of some form of central coordination. Yet Labour was 
still striving to prove that it was a party of government and although it began to support the 
idea of creating a new authority, any reference to the heyday of the GLC when public money 
                                                 
1
 There were six other Metropolitan Councils: Greater Manchester, Merseyside, South Yorkshire, Tyne and 
Wear, West Midlands and West Yorkshire. 
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was liberally thrown at all sorts of colourful associations was quickly quashed.
2
 The creation 
of a new authority had to fit into New Labour’s modern vision of government which is why 
they wanted one of their apparatchiks to become mayor rather than a dyed-in-the-wool 
Londoner more prone to defend the interests of the capital city than the party. 
Livingstone resisted and having won the election as an independent candidate almost 
immediately entered into fierce ideological opposition with central government over use of a 
public-private partnership (PPP) in order to renovate the London underground. Despite failing 
to prevent implementation of the PPP, the success of the congestion charge left him standing 
unchallenged over London and New Labour came to terms with the fact that he was their best 
chance of retaining the helm of the Greater London Authority (GLA) in the 2004 election. His 
second mandate was thus inevitably marked by far greater cooperation between London and 
central government especially in view of the Olympic bid while in the aftermath of 7/7, 
Livingstone raised himself to a new height of popularity becoming the symbol of how “his” 
multicultural London would not be shaken by the terrorists’ cowardice. But this obsessive 
possessiveness was giving the impression that London was Livingstone’s city to do with as he 
pleased including the enormous budget that was at his disposal.
3
 
A year before the 2008 election, it was generally thought that Livingstone would once 
again romp to victory mainly because there was apparently no other candidate capable of 
taking him on. Everyone took Alexander Boris de Pfeffel Johnson’s candidacy with a pinch of 
salt but as it turned out “Boris’ ” victory based on the slogan “Time for a Change” was to 
foreshadow his party’s success in the 2010 General Election. 
This article will look at how Ken Livingstone has been one of the most prominent 
politicians in recent British history and just how his personal brand of politics has left its mark 
not only on the capital but also on the relationship between London and central government. It 
will be argued that decentralising power is meaningless if the ultimate goal is merely to create 
obedient relays for central government policy. This would possibly have been achieved if Ken 
Livingstone had refrained from standing up first and foremost for the interests of the capital 
rather than those of the party he has always belonged to. To this end, he has most certainly 
constantly been the thorn in the Labour Party’s side acting as a permanent reminder of its not 
too distant “old” Labour past. 
                                                 
2
 One of the most famous was the group of mothers who opposed nuclear missiles being positioned on British 
soil and they would take their infants along to demonstrations in an attempt to attract more media attention and 
protect themselves against the police. The group was known as “Babes against the Bomb”. 
3
 The London Assembly which is essentially consultative can block the mayor’s budget if two thirds of the 25 
members disagree with it. The GLA’s budget comes from central government finance, a “precept” added on to 
local taxes and income from other sources such as the congestion charge. 
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Early days: caucus voting 
 
Ken Livingstone was not destined to become leader of the GLC following the elections 
in 1981 since the Labour Party’s campaign had been run under the assumption that in the 
event of victory, the moderate Andrew McIntosh would be chosen. This strategy had been 
designed to ensure that the London electorate would not be put off voting Labour for fear of 
the GLC being run by someone from the far left of the party. Yet, despite campaign claims, 
the day following the elections Livingstone hurriedly organised a meeting during which he 
managed to wrest power from the Labour councillors’ champion. McIntosh was certainly 
popular but Livingstone had the sort of charisma that many councillors felt had enabled them 
to be elected. It was no secret that Livingstone had devoted himself tirelessly to the campaign 
and in the immediate aftermath of victory―albeit less resounding than expected―he was able 
to drum up sufficient support to pull the carpet from underneath the feet of the “natural” 
leader, McIntosh. What is more, the meeting was attended by a majority of the Labour 
councillors and from a wide spectrum of the party’s different internal factions which meant 
that Livingstone could claim that his election was legitimate. The press had a field day 
accusing the Labour Party of betraying its electorate and nicknaming Livingstone “red Ken”, 
a sobriquet that he has never really shed.
4
 Speaking from abroad, Mrs Thatcher rose to the 
challenge and stated that “the GLC will impose upon this nation a tyranny that the peoples of 
Eastern Europe yearn to cast aside”.5 
Having refused to attend the “wedding of the century” between Lady Diana Spencer and 
Prince Charles,
6
 stating that he hadn’t been elected to attend such events, Livingstone quickly 
hit the headlines again by embarking on a campaign to bring down fares in the London 
transport system. His Fares Fair crusade would certainly have been a lot more popular had he 
refrained from showing compassion for the IRA’s cause in the wake of its bomb attacks in 
October. “Red Ken” suddenly became “the most odious man in Britain”7 and when his price 
reductions were declared unlawful a month later by the Law Lords, the GLC stood on the 
brink of bankruptcy, a severe blow to the reputation of the party Livingstone was supposed to 
                                                 
4
 The Sun, May 9th, 1981. The Daily Mail also hounded what it considered to be the “hard” left. 
5
 Speech given by Mrs Thatcher to the Scottish Conservative Conference, 8 May 1981 at Perth City Hall. 
6
 On the wedding day, Livingstone let off a batch of black balloons in London. 
7
 The Sun (editorial), 13 October 1981. See also James Curran, et al., Culture Wars: The Media and the British 
Left, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005, 45. 
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represent. The only way out was to accept a severe hike in prices which gave the press ample 
opportunity to underline the irresponsible attitude of Livingstone and the debilitating effects 
of the “loony left” on the Labour Party. Meanwhile, the Thatcher juggernaut was gathering 
steam and in January 1982 when the first gigantic bill boards were erected on the roof of 
County Hall
8
 indicating the unemployment rate in London, the feeling that the GLC’s 
particular brand of municipal socialism would not be tolerated for long by central government 
was rife. 
It must be said that the GLC was particularly active in pushing back the limits of its 
provocation. Some councillors were at times dumbfounded at the fact that they would spend 
more time debating issues that had very little to do with the mandate for which they had been 
elected than GLC matters; the IRA, nuclear disarmament, the Palestinian question, the 
Falklands war and the miners’ strike would constantly crop up in the debating chamber.9 The 
media loved it all and “rent-a-quote” Livingstone was permanently available to criticise 
central government’s policies.10 His outspoken colourful approach to politics was a 
guaranteed crowd puller, but by dint of defending minority causes and commenting openly on 
a range of major international issues, he was also inevitably bringing the Labour Party into 
disrepute. However, given the disarray that reigned at the heart of the party, they could do 
very little to stop him.  
On the other hand, Mrs Thatcher’s second election victory in June 1983 was the ideal 
opportunity for her party to make it clear that the Metropolitan Councils―above all the 
GLC―were no longer necessary and the White Paper Streamlining the Cities published in 
October compounded the electoral promise by stating that the next step would indeed entail 
the abolition of this stratum of local government. The Conservatives believed that the London 
boroughs would be far more capable of governing London and above all, accountable to their 
electorate. Five months later, Norman Tebbit, Secretary of State for Commerce and Industry 
and chairman of the Conservative Party, publicly gave the debate a clear ideological stance by 
stating that the Metropolitan Councils’ municipal socialism was evil and a threat to the values 
of democracy defended by British institutions.
11
 According to him, it was the government’s 
                                                 
8
 County Hall was the home for London government for much of the 20
th
 century. It was designed by the 
architect Ralph Knott, took just over a decade to build and was inaugurated by George V in 1922. 
9
 Life at County Hall fascinated people to such an extent that as from May 1983, it was periodically narrated in 
The Times by Ann Sofer, a Labour councillor. 
10
 At this time, some journalists were employed full-time to monitor Livingstone’s activities. 
11
 Norman Tebbit, speech at Caxton Hall to the London Conservative Party, 14 March 1984. 
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duty to stamp out this divisive force and ridding the country of the GLC would be one way of 
achieving this.
12
 
Unfortunately for the Conservatives, however, there was little evidence to show that 
public opinion felt so hostile towards the councils and very quickly the facades and roof of 
County Hall, just opposite the Houses of Parliament, were draped with banners stating the 
GLC’s case.13 On March 30th 1984 the Local Government Bill was put to MPs in the House of 
Commons but it took a full seven months for the final Bill to be submitted. The Lords played 
a vital role in slowing down the whole legislative process claiming that the proposed 
legislation was undemocratic insofar as it meant replacing the elected councillors with 
appointed officials for the last year of the GLC’s life.14 Their contribution proved vital in 
prolonging the life of the GLC for one year and their efforts were duly rewarded with new 
banners on the front of County Hall thanking them for their help. Public opinion was 
definitely on the GLC’s side and Livingstone bathed in the glory of being the champion of 
democracy constantly available for the media who faithfully relayed his message to 
Londoners. The GLC was anxious to prove that it was a democratic institution serving a vital 
purpose in the everyday life of Londoners and that getting rid of it was quite simply a political 
ploy by Mrs Thatcher to reduce the influence of Labour in local government. 
But the GLC was fighting a losing battle and the legislation designed to abolish the 
Metropolitan Councils was given Royal Assent on July 15
th
 1985 after a long and protracted 
passage before the two Houses where opposition gradually subsided. The Conservatives’ 
considerable overall majority in the lower chamber was decisive but the creation of the 
London Residuary Board clearly showed that this decision had been above all politically 
motivated. This government quango’s mission was to sift through the colossal number of 
ongoing issues that the GLC had been dealing with and wind them up. Nevertheless, 
following the decision to abolish the councils, the GLC had a year to empty its coffers, and 
this it did, giving an obvious priority to Labour-led boroughs as well as a whole plethora of 
projects associated in any way with left-wing politics. On March 31
st
 1985 at midnight, the 
GLC flag was ceremoniously lowered on the roof of County Hall and Livingstone and his 
acolytes disappeared off into the night only to reappear again in the limelight some fourteen 
years later. 
                                                 
12
 Idem. 
13
 Say No To No Say was the slogan used to denounce the government’s intention to abolish the Metropolitan 
Councils. 
14
 The Conservative government had opted for this strategy in the hope of restraining GLC spending during its 
final year of existence. 
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Turn again Livingstone
15
 
 
Following abolition, Livingstone was unemployed but during the first year took 
advantage of his status as former GLC leader to travel extensively often being invited to 
attend various conferences around the world devoted to issues that he had championed. A 
contract for an autobiography
16
 together with a weekly column in The Sun meant that he was 
financially safe and with his bid to become the MP for Brent East, he set about trying to 
influence the direction in which Labour could go following the 1987 elections that were 
looming. He endorsed a left-wing manifesto but soon after the party’s third defeat in June, the 
psephologists underlined the damage that had been wreaked by the “loony-left” reputation 
bequeathed by a handful of politicians and factions within the Labour Party.
17
 This was the 
perception the party leadership had in any case for they believed that the Conservatives had 
garnered maximum propaganda impact from the antics of the few in the party whose 
behaviour was so detrimental to the many. 
To this end, Neil Kinnock was to use his political skills to take the party down the road 
of modernisation somewhat further than surely many of his followers would have been 
prepared to go at the outset. Needless to say, Livingstone was not one of them and could not 
be herded into the fold of the modernisers despite the fact that he won a seat on the party’s 
National Executive Committee in the September elections and held it for two years.
18
 In order 
to harness his collaboration, Neil Kinnock could have given Livingstone a high-powered job 
within the Labour opposition but the former GLC leader could just not be trusted to be 
entirely faithful to the party’s cause, especially when he took to the national stage and 
perorated, once again, about issues that were a far cry from his duties as MP. It was no secret 
either that Livingstone harboured a strong ambition to lead the party one day, though his 
commitment to its left wing meant that the modernisers preferred ostracism and vilification to 
cajoling. It was nonetheless thanks to a New Labour electoral promise made in 1992 that 
Livingstone was to return to the battleground of London politics despite the fact that he did 
not support the idea of an elected mayor at all in the first place. 
                                                 
15
 This is the title of John Carvel’s first biography of Ken Livingstone. Carvel was local government 
correspondent for The Guardian from 1981 to 1985 and covered most aspects of what he calls “Ken 
Livingstone’s GLC”. John Carvel, Turn Again Livingstone, London: Profile Books, 1999. 
16
 Ken Livingstone, If Voting Changed Anything They’d Abolish It, London: Harper Collins, 1987. 
17
 Such as Militant Tendency for example. 
18
 Livingstone was re-elected to the NEC in 1987 under the very nose of Peter Mandelson. 
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Indeed, during the 1992 electoral campaign, the Labour Party and the Liberal 
Democrats pointed to the lack of a central authority in London and promised that in the event 
of victory, they would look seriously into the possibility of creating some sort of organisation 
capable of taking decisions for the whole of the capital city beyond the boundaries of each 
borough. Housing and culture were mentioned as being the areas where London had suffered 
the most from a lack of central coordination. Even so, New Labour took great pains to explain 
that there was no question of returning to the labyrinthine model of the GLC and that 
something small and “strategic” would bring back the sort of dynamics that London needed in 
order to maintain its authority as a world capital. Several policy documents
19
 were published 
by Labour following the fourth successive electoral defeat in 1992 and the idea of organising 
a referendum to ask Londoners to endorse central government’s choice was put forward. The 
1997 election manifesto made it clear that should Labour be elected, there would be a 
referendum in London to see indeed if people agreed with the government’s plans to create an 
assembly and a directly elected mayor for the capital. But had New Labour been able to 
foresee such a landslide victory, not only would it have dispensed with the referendum but its 
whole strategy to elect the new mayor would have been quite different. 
Following New Labour’s victory, members of the Conservative Party now sitting on the 
benches of Her Majesty’s Opposition were surprised at the fits of “manifestoitis” that the 
government seemed to be going through. Apparently, in order to prove that it was a party of 
government that meant business, New Labour felt compelled to carry out everything in its 
manifesto, right down to the finest details. The referendum is a case in point because given 
New Labour’s absolute majority which included 57 out of the 74 seats in London itself, the 
government could have revised its ambitions for the capital. Even Ken Livingstone himself 
expressed his surprise at the party’s desire to give London a directly elected mayor, an idea 
which he put to the House of Commons in his usual forthright style: 
 
If we are honest, my party knows that there is no overwhelming support for a separately elected 
mayor in the London Labour Party, among London Labour borough council leaders, or among 
Labour members. We know that the Prime Minister is enthusiastic about the idea and that he 
genuinely believes in it. Massive pressure was brought to bear on Labour borough leaders to go 
along with the idea and not to rock the boat or appear disloyal. So we all went along with it; we 
did not make a fuss; it was what the leader wanted. But we must get it right: the leader may be 
wrong. After real thought and real consultation with Londoners, we may decide not to proceed 
with it.
20
 
 
                                                 
19
 Working Together for London (1994), A Choice for England (1996), A Voice for London (1996). 
20
 Hansard, 6 June 1997, col. 717. 
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A year later, the referendum was over and done with and, albeit on a low turnout (34.6%), 
Londoners had voted for the chance to elect a mayor and an assembly for London. Despite 
earlier questioning of his party’s choice, Ken Livingstone had realised that this job would be 
perfectly suited to his talents but little did he know at this early date that New Labour was 
going to do everything possible to force him to stand down. Until now, Livingstone had been 
no more than an outspoken troublesome element, but when the time came to select Labour’s 
official candidate, conflict between the two was to reach a peak and last for a good five years 
in full view of the international media. 
 
 
Nomination and abomination 
 
Livingstone says he took the decision to seek the Labour Party’s nomination when he 
began to realise to what extent Millbank had an iron grip on the whole process and that 
Londoners might be excluded from choosing their candidate.
21
 This was a convenient way for 
him to justify his U-turn on the issue having explained at length that the concentration of so 
much power in the hands of one person was, according to him, a mistake.
22
 It would 
inevitably lead to American style politics with the executive mayor “wheeling and dealing” at 
the top. The truth of the matter was that being mayor of an international city such as London 
meant that Livingstone would once again have the responsibilities and power that 
corresponded to his personal and political ambitions. 
New Labour, on the other hand, saw things otherwise and was very keen to place one of 
its own on the highest step of the London podium. Tony Blair and his political advisors knew 
only too well that the creation of a power base in London would be the ideal relay for their 
political project and enable them to carry it far beyond the frontiers of the capital and even the 
country. This is why they put so much energy into excluding Livingstone from the nomination 
process and, if this were to fail, the party machinery would be used to block his selection. 
Trevor Phillips was the first candidate to declare only to withdraw a short time later, followed 
by Glenda Jackson, while Nick Raynsford, the Minister for London, felt that he was the 
party’s “natural” candidate having steered legislation to create the Greater London Authority 
through Parliament in the first place. Despite Raynsford’s track record, New Labour preferred 
                                                 
21
 The Labour Party had its headquarters in Millbank Tower in London. The Millbank Tendency, a pun on 
Militant Tendency, is used to underline New Labour’s so called taste for spin. 
22
 Hansard, 6 June 1997, op. cit. 
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to back Frank Dobson, Secretary of State for Health, faithful to the party’s cause but also 
outspoken enough to at least give Londoners the impression that he would not be just a puppet 
mayor for the government. Even so, the whole process was overshadowed by the prospect of 
Livingstone entering the fray for his opponents feared the groundswell of support that he 
would certainly be able to muster. 
The main bone of contention between Livingstone and New Labour was the 
commitment by the latter to use a public-private partnership (PPP) to renovate the London 
underground. This had been written into the manifesto and as a Labour MP, Livingstone had 
signed up to it. But he had other ideas for the underground believing that Londoners should be 
in command and not central government whose choices dictated by ideology did not always 
tally with local demand. Livingstone wanted to create an extensive public bond system 
whereby Londoners would be able to invest in their own public transport and reap the benefits 
both financial and social of a modernised underground. He dutifully attacked the PPP as being 
the partial privatisation of transport given that it meant handing management of the system 
over to private companies for at least thirty years.
23
 In view of this, New Labour and 
Livingstone could only come to a very muddled agreement over the party’s manifesto for 
London governance and it was only after these difficult negotiations that he was publicly 
allowed to be part of the selection process. Dobson, however, was being portrayed as New 
Labour’s official candidate and when the results of the selection process were made public on 
February 20
th
 2000, he had won by a slim margin, Livingstone coming in a close second. But 
given the method of selection used,
24
 an electoral college which gave full advantage to block 
votes and very little to individual members, Livingstone openly questioned the result and 
stated that he was toying with the idea of running as an independent candidate. This he duly 
did two weeks later choosing The Evening Standard to state his case and put the responsibility 
for his decision squarely on the outrageous behaviour of New Labour’s spin doctors and their 
desire to maintain power within the Prime Minister’s closest circle: 
                                                 
23
 One of the main fears of Livingstone and his transport specialist Robert Kiley, was that security would be 
neglected by the private companies and the accidents at Paddington, Southall and, a year later, at Hatfield had 
made public opinion aware of this particular point. 
24
 The electoral college was divided into three parts, each one counting for 33% of the vote. These categories 
were i) individual members of the Labour Party, ii) London MPs, MEPs and Assembly candidates and 
iii) organisations affiliated to the Labour Party such as the unions and co-operative societies. Party members in 
London were balloted individually whereas the affiliated organisations could choose to use individual votes or 
the block vote according to their own internal procedures. The share of each individual organisation was 
calculated according to its affiliation fee to the London party.  MPs, MEPS and Assembly candidates were 
balloted individually which gave this small group considerable weight compared to ordinary party members. For 
further details see Timothy Whitton, Ken “le rouge” et la Mairie de Londres : Du Greater London Council à la 
Greater London Authority, Paris: l’Harmattan, 2010, 67-68. 
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I have been forced to choose between the party I love and upholding the democratic rights of 
Londoners. I have concluded that defence of the principle of London’s right to govern itself 
requires that I stand as an independent candidate for London mayor on 4 May.
25
 
 
New Labour had no option but to exclude Ken Livingstone which they did on April 30
th
 for a 
period of five years. In the 1980s, Livingstone had taken on the Thatcher governments and 
won quite a number of small victories. He was now going to confront not only the 
Conservatives but also the party he had devoted his entire political life to. 
 
 
First election and congestion charge mandate 
 
Livingstone’s strategy was as simple as they come: given that the turnout for local 
elections is traditionally low in Great Britain, he opted for a very personal campaign 
characterised by the deliberately provocative slogans Vote4Ken and Ken4London. Having set 
up a subscription to collect funds, his campaign team purchased a London bus, painted it 
purple and drove around London asking car drivers via another slogan to Hoot4Ken. The 
contrast between his campaign and his rivals’ was particularly striking: given that he was a 
celebrity, “our Ken” as Londoners would fondly refer to him, could get away with 
deliberately exacerbating the personalisation of this election which would be to his own 
advantage. On the one hand, Livingstone would use a megaphone on the upper deck of the 
purple bus to promise people better weather if he was elected while on the other, engage in 
serious political discussion on the television and radio. Livingstone specialised in being 
ostensibly self-deprecating and once again considerably increased audience ratings for the 
various chat shows to which he was invited. The upshot of this was that while his rivals got 
bogged down in the petty details of London governance, Livingstone rode high on his 
reputation for being a “cheeky chappy” declaring that his main aim would be to let Londoners 
govern their great capital rather than central government. This struck a chord especially given 
New Labour’s attitude to the selection process and indeed to politics in general. In the first 
lines of his manifesto which, just like the other candidates, set out his main policies for 
London, Livingstone made his ambitions for the GLA crystal clear: 
 
                                                 
25
 Charles Reiss, “Livingstone: I will run for mayor”, The Evening Standard, 6 March 2000. 
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The direct election of a Mayor and Assembly for London will give Londoners back the right to 
govern their own affairs and decide upon their own priorities. I am standing as an independent 
candidate because I believe the job of the Mayor will be to stand up for London. If candidates and 
policies can be imposed centrally then devolution will mean nothing.
26
 
 
The general feeling was that Livingstone would romp to victory quite simply because 
there was no one to stop him. It must be said that generally speaking, the candidates’ 
manifestos were similar enough to make it difficult for the electorate to make their choice. By 
and large they underlined the role that the mayor should play to improve policing, public 
transport, air quality and housing while defending the place of London as an international 
capital. Even so, Livingstone once again managed to stand out from the rest by pledging to 
bring in a congestion charge in the event of becoming London’s first executive mayor. 
It is difficult to assess the impact of this flagship proposal on Londoners but despite the 
May Day riots which scarred London,
27
 Ken Livingstone was elected Mayor of London three 
days later, New Labour’s official candidate, Frank Dobson, only coming in a sorry third 
behind the Conservative candidate, Steven Norris.
28
 Turnout was disappointingly low – some 
33,5% - given the political climate in which the election had taken place and despite 
predictions, Livingstone failed to obtain the 50% required to be elected outright during this 
first round.
29
 He had undoubtedly benefitted from the electorate’s desire to punish New 
Labour for its management not only of the selection process but also for its overall political 
arrogance. But above all, it was his maverick style, rhetoric and political independence which 
had appealed to everyday Londoners only too willing to use the ballot box to express their 
positive perception of these qualities and their negative reaction to “Blair’s mayor”. By 
electing “citizen Ken”, Londoners had sent Millbank a clear message about how they 
considered their capital should be governed with the advantage of not handing over any power 
to the Conservatives.
30
 
                                                 
26
 Ken4London, “Ken Livingstone’s Manifesto for London”, document prepared by Simon Fletcher, member of 
the “Livingstone for London” team. 
27
 On May 1
st 
London hosts an anti-capitalist demonstration. In 2000, a handful of violent protesters marred the 
otherwise peaceful event and the ensuing riots left the statue of Winston Churchill and the Cenotaph soiled by 
graffiti which considerably shocked public opinion. The Sun quite openly associated Livingstone with the rioters 
and with a photo of them on the front page their headline ran: “A vote for Ken is a vote for them”, The Sun, 3 
May 2000. 
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 At the same time, the Labour Party gained 9 seats on the London assembly as did the Conservatives , the 
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In the 2008 elections the figures stand at 8, 11, 3 and 2, with UKIP not winning a single seat whereas the British 
National Party obtained one. For full details see Timothy WHITTON, Ken “le rouge” et la Mairie de Londres : 
Du Greater London Council à la Greater London Authority, op. cit., annexes I, II & III, 195-198. 
29
 For full results see ibid, 81-82 & annexe V. 
30
 This attitude was confirmed time and again by the popular support that ordinary Londoners would give the 
mayor. See for example ‘[...] A small gaggle of supporters cheered him as he entered court Number 3 to hear the 
minute detail of Transport for London's claim that the Government's procurement of private firms was unlawful’, 
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The Mayor of London and central government were very quickly to cross swords about 
the PPP for the London underground and their relationship was to be dogged by this conflict 
for the next two years. As if to reaffirm his independence and show that policies for London 
would not be dictated by New Labour, Livingstone also swiftly announced his intention to set 
up the congestion charge which was to be the greatest success of his first mandate: drivers 
entering the centre of London would have to pay a daily charge or risk being fined. This 
corresponded both to his election pledges and to the legislation creating the GLA which 
clearly stipulates that the mayor is fully entitled to charge people for using roads within the 
area under his authority on condition that any profit made should be reinvested in public 
transport.
31
 Livingstone made his case for the congestion charge in precisely this way stating 
that his aim was to reduce traffic and therefore air pollution while improving public transport 
at the same time. This sort of project tallied perfectly with New Labour’s thirst for the sort of 
innovation that would enable them to become a beacon for political renewal beyond the 
boundaries of the United Kingdom. Given the potential success of such a project and the 
political credibility likely to be gained by its instigator, questions were quickly raised about 
the reintegration of Livingstone into the ranks of the Labour Party. It was quite clear that both 
sides stood to reap greater benefit from working together than as opposing forces and 
Livingstone was quite aware that he would be able to sell his collaboration with central 
government at a high price. CrossRail
32
 was one major project he was particularly interested 
in as well as a new bridge across the Thames, both being the ideal way to leave a lasting 
legacy of his work as mayor of London. 
As both sides made their cases for and against PPP, resorting to the expertise of 
numerous accountants and other forms of assessment, all paid for out of public funds it must 
be said, New Labour prepared and won the General Election in 2001. This meant that they 
could apply increasing pressure to their PPP project in London and gradually the resistance 
organised by the mayor began to dwindle. It must be added that one of the keys to the success 
of his congestion charge was the improvement of public transport given that it would have to 
absorb a substantial increase in the number of passengers. To this end, slowing down the 
renovation of the underground meant jeopardising the capacity of public transport to 
accompany the desired switch from private cars to buses, trains and the tube. This probably 
                                                                                                                                                        
in Paul Waugh, “Livingstone vents his fury as his bid to rejoin Labour fails; mayoral election: former GLC 
leader ends a hectic day still an independent after NEC blocks his aim of standing for the party in 2004”,  The 
Independent, 24 July 2002.  
31
 The Greater London Authority Act, 1999, section 295, “Road User Charging”. 
32
 CrossRail is a rail line that will link up Shenfield in the east of London to Maidenhead in the west. 
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accounted for Livingstone’s choice to abandon legal proceedings against the government in 
July 2002 concerning the PPP for the underground
33
 while at the same time the private 
company Capita was busy installing the necessary equipment to make the centre of London 
ready for the congestion charge.
34
 Nevertheless, when on July 24
th
, City Hall was inaugurated 
by the Queen, Livingstone was informed that the Labour Party’s NEC had voted 17 to 13 
against reducing his five year exclusion from the party. The decision was painful, but Blair, 
Brown, Clarke and Prescott had been particularly efficient in twisting the arms of the reticent, 
those who believed that Livingstone would be far more useful inside the party than waging 
trench warfare from outside. Surprisingly enough it was the “left-wing troublemaker of the 
committee”, Dennis Skinner, who led calls to maintain the exclusion explaining that 
Livingstone would never be a team player and that “principles cost in life”.35 It was not so 
much a call to the arms of New Labour, as a criticism of Livingstone’s tendency to use 
personality rather than politics to obtain satisfaction. This was enough to sway the NEC and 
the mayor’s political future now depended more than ever on the success of the congestion 
charge.
36
 
The charge was to come into force on February 17
th
 2003 at the beginning of the school 
holidays so as to take advantage of a foreseeable drop in traffic. Despite an underground 
accident which had seriously disrupted transport in the centre of the city at the end of January, 
Livingstone decided to go ahead with his plans and with the whole world looking on, the 
system came to life as planned at 7am on the 17
th
. None of the chaos that the media had 
foreseen actually occurred and apart from a few minor incidents largely caused by anti-
congestion charge demonstrations, the system seemed to run quite smoothly. Government 
ministers begrudgingly acknowledged the success of the charge and during his monthly press 
conference in April, Tony Blair praised the mayor for his audacity in bringing it in. But Blair 
was looking beyond the limits of the congestion charge to the Olympic agenda knowing full 
well that Livingstone, mayor of London, would play a vital role in any attempt to bring the 
Games to Britain. 
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34
 This meant erecting signposts, painting large “C”s on the roads to indicate the congestion charge zone and 
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The Independent, 24 July 2002. 
36
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4
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 2011, to £10. 
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Reintegration, re-election and “Olympic” Ken 
 
In November 2003, there was no doubt that the congestion charge had been a success 
and despite the statistics that were less optimistic than the official forecast, London was the 
first major city in the world to boast a sophisticated charging system capable of monitoring 
traffic in the centre of the city. The congestion charge had become part of life in London and 
was undeniably one of the jewels in Ken Livingstone’s crown, a true symbol of what he had 
to offer as mayor. New Labour therefore had a difficult task given that it would lose 
significant face if it decided to reintegrate him at this point in time solely for the purposes of 
the 2004 mayoral election. On the other hand, there was no getting round the fact that despite 
his frequent outbursts about questions that had little to do with his mandate as mayor of 
London,
37
 he was popular and would inevitably play a vital role in London’s bid to host the 
Olympic Games. John Prescott and Gordon Brown loathed him and Blair brushed the issue 
off by saying that the NEC would be responsible for the decision. Behind the scenes, 
however, the Prime Minister politely ordered his lieutenants to make sure that Livingstone 
was brought back into the party well before the elections in May so that Labour could retain 
London:
38
 Blair knew only too well that the local elections were going to be the ideal 
opportunity for the British electorate to give his party a bloody nose and that London had to 
be held at all costs.
39
 The party’s prospective candidate, Nicky Gavron, was not versed in the 
murky turmoil of local politics and stood little chance of winning, especially if Livingstone 
were to stand once again as an independent. 
So Mayor Livingstone just sat back and watched as New Labour sweated in trying to 
find a dignified way of bringing him back into the fold without being seen as giving in to the 
lure of electoral opportunism. They twisted and turned and in December, having informed 
Nicky Gavron that she would probably have to stand aside, they came up with the idea of 
inviting Livingstone to fulfil an electoral mission for the party which, if accepted, would 
automatically put an end to his exclusion. The press had another field day as did New 
Labour’s political opponents and in January, when the NEC finally voted the motion defining 
Livingstone’s mission and effectively terminating his exclusion, he candidly stated: “There 
                                                 
37
 The day before George Bush’s visit to London, Livingstone declared that the American president was the 
“greatest threat to life on this planet that we’ve most probably ever seen”, quoted in Nigel Morris, “The Bush 
State Visit: Livingstone says ‘Bush is greatest threat to life on planet’”, The Independent, 18 November 2003. 
38
 On November 6
th
 2003, Blair and Livingstone opened a factory together in Dagenham and during the next few 
days a part of the press triumphantly claimed that “Blair wants Livingstone back!”. See for example The 
Guardian, 10 November 2003. 
39
 There was a general feeling of disappointment with New Labour compounded by the very negative perception 
public opinion had of the―illegal―war in Iraq. 
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have been two dominant political figures of the last two decades: Blair and Thatcher. Both 
have tried to crush me―and both have failed.”40 But it soon became clear that Livingstone’s 
readmission into the party had been a calculated decision when Gordon Brown declared 
officially that the government would finance a new bridge across the Thames.
41
 Two days 
later, Blair and Livingstone shook hands in front of the media to seal London’s bid for the 
2012 Olympic Games and to all present, it seemed as if a new era of collaboration had 
dawned between the mayor of London and central government. 
Yet it was not quite that simple given that the opinion polls had shown that Livingstone 
was likely to win the next election whichever capacity he chose to stand in.
42
 If he chose to 
defend the colours of the Labour Party it was because he stood to harness a great deal of 
personal gain from this decision while knowing full well that all GLA demands for financial 
help from central government would be made by the party’s official candidate rather than a 
renegade who, for the last four years, had been shunned. Even so, despite this new feeling of 
cooperation, reinforced by the tragic events of the bomb attacks in Madrid which highlighted 
just how vulnerable major cities were to terrorist attack,
43
 Livingstone continued to play the 
maverick and, as if to underline his independence vis-à-vis central government, kept on 
voicing his opinions about income tax on the rich, Ariel Sharon, the Saudi Arabian Royal 
Family, George Bush, the corruption between the White House and the major oil companies 
and the Middle-East peace process to name but a few. Livingstone’s strategy was obvious: if 
he wanted to triumph once again in 2004 he needed the electorate to reconnect with “red” 
Ken, the candidate who would speak his mind and defend the interests of the capital without 
kowtowing to central government, especially a very unpopular one. And he knew he could do 
this within the safety of the electoral mission that he had been entrusted with by the NEC. 
Livingstone’s strategy paid dividends because on June 10th, he held his head high once 
again while New Labour suffered in the local elections, undoubtedly paying heavily for its 
political record and above all its involvement in Iraq. Livingstone had taken a calculated risk 
by conniving once again with the Labour Party, winning with a slimmer margin than in 2000, 
but he was fully aware that future collaboration would be a question of give and take, 
especially concerning the respective roles that each would play in the plans to host the 
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41
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42
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43
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, 191 people were killed in a series of bomb attacks. 
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Olympic Games. Livingstone was not particularly interested in sport
44
 but knew that Olympic 
funds would enable the regeneration of a 750-acre area
45
 to the east of the capital that had 
been earmarked to accommodate the Games if given to London.
46
 The problem was that 
Livingstone just could not hold his tongue and shortly after London’s candidature had been 
made official, his altercation with a journalist from The Evening Standard was to cast serious 
doubts on his ability to manage the GLA’s contribution to the Olympic effort.47 New Labour 
cringed even more when shortly after the Olympic Evaluation Commission had left London, 
having spent a week reviewing the city’s bid, not only did the mayor refuse to apologise for 
insulting the journalist but he took advantage of the press conference to once again vent his 
anger on various foreign leaders. The spokesman for the Commission informed the British 
government that the mayor of London would do better to keep a firm grip on his behaviour 
which in the tight contest looming between Paris and London for the Olympic Games could 
be a clinching factor. Meanwhile, New Labour was busy preparing for the next General 
Election to be held in May and it goes without saying that the Olympic bid was at the heart of 
their political message. Any embarrassment caused by the antics of “Blair’s mayor” would 
most certainly have a negative impact on the outcome for New Labour. 
The results of the 2005 General Election gave New Labour a third consecutive victory 
even so, but showed a clear reduction in the popular support for their political project. Once 
this hurdle had been crossed, all eyes quickly focused on Singapore where the result of the 
2012 Olympic contest was to be announced. On July 6
th
 2005 there was a moment of sheer 
joy when Jacques Rogge announced that the Games had been awarded to London but it was 
short-lived. Within a few hours, London had been the target of the worst terrorist attacks in its 
history that claimed the lives of fifty-two people and injured hundreds of others. Speaking 
from his hotel in Singapore, Livingstone condemned the cowardice of the terrorists by stating 
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that these attacks had killed ordinary everyday Londoners
48
 and a week later he gave one of 
his most moving speeches in Trafalgar Square when he underlined how multicultural London 
would brace itself and withstand these tragic events.
49
 New Labour could only admire 
“statesman” Livingstone and for some time he symbolised the massive rejection of everything 
the terrorists stood for. This was not only to take him to new heights of popularity but it also 
meant that public opinion did not vent its anger so much on New Labour and gave them some 
breathing space for a short while. However, as was his wont, Livingstone managed yet again 
to reverse the tendency comprising his chances to win London for the third consecutive time.  
 
 
The 2008 election: a downhill struggle 
 
A week after 7/7 London was once again targeted by the terrorists but the blasts were 
small and no one was injured. In this climate of suspicion, Jean-Charles de Menezes, 
suspected by the police of being on the point of setting off a bomb carried in his back pack, 
was shot dead. In the aftermath of this tragic accident, Livingstone, while giving his full 
support to the police, publicly stated that in certain circumstances, in some parts of the world, 
oppressed people were driven to commit acts of terrorism. The Churchillian tone of his 
reaction to 7/7 suddenly sounded false and the press reminded the public of Livingstone’s 
connivance, a year earlier, with Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, a controversial Muslim preacher. 
When questioned about this, Livingstone sparked off an uproar in the Catholic community by 
suggesting that al-Qaradawi was like the Pope insofar as he was a major reformer within his 
religious community. As the summer wore on, Livingstone’s popularity ratings fell and 
Londoners began to pin the blame on him for a variety of tribulations that their city was 
having to deal with: there were fewer shoppers in the city centre which was obviously bad for 
business, the beloved “Imperial” buses or Routemasters were gradually being phased out and 
replaced by the hated “bendy buses” and the congestion charge had been increased. But it was 
the erection of the statue of a naked, handicapped and pregnant woman in Trafalgar Square 
that really made Londoners wonder about their mayor’s governance of their city.50 Just as he 
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had brought the Labour Party into disrepute with his antics during the 1980s, Livingstone was 
having precisely the same effect on New Labour twenty years later. As if this was not enough 
to tarnish his reputation, Livingstone also lost his court case concerning his verbal abuse of a 
Jewish journalist and in February 2006, was suspended for one month from his job of mayor 
of London.
51
 Although he won his appeal, the relationship between the GLA and the Jewish 
community of London had become strained especially when the mayor publicly insulted the 
Reuben brothers, two of the main partners of the consortium responsible for building the 
Olympic village.
52
 The American ambassador was his next target
53
 for not paying the 
congestion charge and in April, when Livingstone went to Beijing to tour the Olympic 
infrastructure, he cheerfully told the press that Britain should take a long hard look at herself 
as far as human rights were concerned given the way in which members of the IRA had been 
tortured. He also reminded journalists of the way in which the Australian aborigines had been 
dealt with by the British authorities and declared that the events on Tiananmen Square and the 
Poll Tax were comparable.
54
 
The result of this attitude was that Livingstone was portrayed in the press as lording 
over London and The Evening Standard upped its relentless campaign to point out the 
weaknesses in his governance. The Olympic budget which quickly spiralled out of control to 
reach figures that nobody could really relate to was a case in point and when in May 2006, the 
Venezuelan President, Hugo Chavez, visited Britain but refused to meet Blair preferring to 
spend time with the Mayor of London, the idea that Livingstone was creating a “Kenocracy” 
began to circulate in the media. The “brooms for oil” deal that the two brokered, whereby 
Venezuela promised to sell London cheap oil in exchange for expertise on urban and traffic 
management, was portrayed as being the way in which Livingstone had come to view London 
as being “his” city, not in the sense that he had embodied in his post 7/7 speech but that he 
was surrounding himself with his cronies in order to run the capital. The extension of the 
congestion charge was another example of how Livingstone was somehow losing his “citizen 
Ken” touch with his electorate for despite consultation that showed an overwhelming hostility 
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to the project, he had decided to go ahead believing that it was the GLA’s role to continue 
improving air quality while convincing car drivers to switch to public transport. The downside 
of this was that Livingstone was becoming associated with the government’s extremely 
unpopular plans to introduce road charges on a national scale and Downing Street was only 
too pleased to share the responsibility for this with the GLA. 
Despite Livingstone’s waning popularity, he still seemed to have no serious opponent 
able to take the job of London mayor away from him in the forthcoming 2008 elections. In an 
effort to renew New Labour’s appeal, Tony Blair had been replaced by Gordon Brown but 
this did not stop Livingstone from yet again confronting his party about the PPP for the 
underground when one of the major companies involved, Metronet, declared itself bankrupt. 
This was exactly the sort of incident that Livingstone had dreaded, quite apart from his 
ideological desire to see the underground run by Londoners through their democratically 
elected council. Any major financial incident concerning the thirty-year contracts signed 
within the framework of the PPP meant employing an army of lawyers to determine the 
responsibilities of the parties involved. Gordon Brown on the other hand, stuck to his guns, 
out of his distaste for Livingstone but also because of the economic orthodoxy that had given 
him the reputation of being the “Iron” Chancellor and which he intended to pursue as Prime 
Minister. Although the GLA would be heavily involved in the renovation of the underground, 
Metronet would be replaced by another private company to guarantee the continuity of the 
PPP. To sugar the pill however, Brown also gave the final go-ahead for the construction of 
CrossRail and above all for the £16-billion costs that this would involve. 
But all in all, Livingstone had lowered his guard and was boosted by another popular 
success when the first stage of the Tour de France was organised in London in July 2007; 
nothing seemed to be in his way to win a third mandate. The press quite openly declared that 
Livingstone would be elected without any challenger not because opposing him would be 
futile but through a lack of any credible rival. And this was exactly where the Conservative 
candidate, Alexander Boris de Pfeffel Johnson knew he had a serious card to play because he 
could tackle Livingstone on his own turf by personalising his campaign as much as possible 
so that the electorate would relate to him rather than his policies. The issue for any opponent 
was that Livingstone could now be judged on what he had accomplished and whatever their 
feelings were towards their mayor, Londoners easily associated him very positively with the 
Oyster card, the congestion charge and the Olympic Games. It had to be acknowledged that 
Livingstone had given London back the voice that had been missing for fourteen long years 
after the abolition of the GLC in 1986. This is why the Conservative candidate very quickly 
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dropped his full name and was referred to solely as “Boris” just as the incumbent mayor had 
relied on “Ken” to make himself a more familiar face in London households. 
Yet when it came to the election campaign that really took off in January 2008, perhaps 
the Conservative candidate’s masterstroke was his slogan which read quite simply “Time for a 
Change”55 as opposed to Livingstone’s “Vote for London―Ken”. The Evening Standard was 
mercilessly underlining the weak points in Livingstone’s two mandates and when the mayor’s 
right-hand man, Lee Jasper, was forced to leave office after several financial scandals had 
been unearthed, the mayor’s slightly amateurish approach to the management of London’s 
finances was emphasised with the ever increasing costs of the Olympic Games providing his 
enemies with a constant source of ammunition. Meanwhile, “Ken’s friends” were the focus of 
a great deal of media attention and just as public opinion had fallen out of love with New 
Labour, the tide turned sufficiently away from Livingstone for Johnson to become the second 
mayor of London on May 1
st
 2008. 
Livingstone’s defeat can be put down to a multitude of factors but a handful stands out 
as having sealed his fate. Firstly, the sleaze that had begun to surround the mayor at City Hall, 
especially given that it went hand in hand with his penchant for cronyism. Secondly, the sort 
of financial management that did not tally with the requirements of the city’s colossal budget. 
Thirdly, his multicultural approach to “all things London” which had begun to leave the 
majority bewildered and resenting the attention constantly paid to the minorities. But above 
all, after two mandates, Londoners felt that they could no longer relate to their mayor as “our” 
Ken; he was no longer one of theirs and had colluded with New Labour to the extent that he 
really had become “Blair’s mayor”. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Ken Livingstone’s political ideology certainly matured during his time in office at the 
GLA and even though his penchant for provocation and controversy remained intact, he did 
manage to take on board some of the more general economic principles espoused by New 
Labour. Yet in doing so, he resisted the dogmatism of modernisation which seemed to be the 
leitmotiv dictating so many of New Labour’s policy choices. Livingstone was successful in 
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Minister John Howard. 
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that he constantly managed to defend his decisions as being the best “deal” for London. This 
personal brand of politics enabled him to keep abreast of contemporary politics without 
excluding him from choices that were reminiscent of “old” Labour and which Londoners 
could relate to with some affection especially at times when national politics were so 
lacklustre. 
Had Livingstone managed to remain faithful to the brand name that he had established 
rather than to his obsessive possessiveness of the capital city, then chances are 2008 would 
have been a different story. This would have enabled him to maintain a distinct political 
profile and keep him above the murky turmoil of everyday municipal politics. As it happened, 
he had become too embroiled in the everyday running of the capital to the extent that whilst 
campaigning, Londoners would question him about the nitty-gritty of running such a huge 
city leaving his opponent a better opportunity to expound on a more glamorous agenda for the 
capital. Boris Johnson became the star whilst the relationship between the incumbent mayor 
and his political party was ambiguous enough for their political trajectories to cross at some 
points thus leaving the electorate in doubt about whom they would actually be voting for. 
Livingstone made no secret about wanting to be candidate for the 2012 mayoral 
elections and in September 2010 won the Labour Party’s nomination yet again. His 
relationship with Labour has indeed been tumultuous over the years especially when he has 
symbolised the “old” Labour that the modernisers have striven so hard to relegate to the 
forgotten past. But neither has Labour always been fair to one of the most maverick 
politicians that the party has ever fostered to the extent that on many occasions between them, 
it has been difficult to distinguish between the rose and the thorn. If Livingstone fails to 
become mayor again in 2012 and retires, he will most certainly devote a substantial part of his 
memoirs to the way in which he stood up to some of the most powerful political leaders and 
parties in recent British history. For all his failings, this is certainly how he will be 
remembered and admired for the most. 
 
Timothy Whitton 
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